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II. ARGUMENT IN REPLY
As predicted in the Opening Brief, the state argues that the original sentence was not an
illegal sentence for purposes of Rule 35 and therefore the district court did not have jurisdiction
to set aside the sentence. From this it argues that the Rule 33 motion to withdraw the guilty plea
was untimely. As explained below, the court did have jurisdiction over both motions. Moreover,
it should be presumed that the district court was acting vindictively when it imposed a harsher
sentence upon resentencing

A. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Rule 35 Motion to Correct an Illegal
Sentence.

The state first argues that a sentence imposed in violation of Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho
558, 149 P.3d 833 (2006), is not an illegal sentence, but merely a sentence imposed in an illegal
manner. From this it concludes that the district court had no jurisdiction to rule on the motion to
con-ect an illegal sentence. But really the state's argument is only that the district court was
wrong in granting the motion. As noted in the opening brief, the state cannot make that argument
now because it did not file a cross appeal. See State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372, 377, 195 P.3d
731, 736 (Ct. App. 2008) (The state may not seek affirmative relief on appeal in the absence of a
timely filed notice of cross-appeal.)
The state, in response to the above, now attempts to cast the issue in jurisdictional terms
in order to avoid that problem. Its argument is without merit becanse it confuses the question of
jurisdiction, i.e., whether the court has the power to decide the motion, with the question of
whether the motion was meritorious. Putting aside the question of whether the district court was
con-ect in granting the motion, it is beyond peradventure that it had the authority to decide the

motion. "The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time[.]" ICR 35. Therefore, the filing
of a motion for the correction of an illegal sentence in a criminal case confers jurisdiction to
decide the motion upon the district court.
The existence of jurisdiction upon a timely motion is illustrated in State v. Vetch, 101
Idaho 595,618 P.2d 773 (1980). There, the defendant claimed that the sentence was illegal
because he had been charged, convicted and sentenced for a more severe crime than an
accomplice in violation of the equal protection clause. (This is a claim of an illegally imposed
sentence.) The motion was denied and the Supreme Court considered the case. First, it stated
that "[ u]nder Rule 35, a motion for correction or reduction of sentence based upon imposition of
an illegal sentence is not subject to the 120 day time constraint." Thus, it did not matter "that the
motion was filed long after the 120 day period provided for in Rule 35." 101 Idaho at 595-6, 618
P.2d at 773-74. After finding that the motion was timely, the Court then considered the merits of
the argument and concluded that the sentence was not illegal. Id. ("The fact that the defendant
was charged and convicted for a more serious crime and received a greater sentence than his
accomplice does not make the sentence illegal.") The Court did not find that the district comi
lacked jurisdiction to decide the motion and affirm the district court's denial of the motion upon
that basis. Rather, the Court implicitly held that the district court had jurisdiction to consider the
motion whether the sentence was illegal or not and then proceeding to find the sentence was
legal. See also State v. Haggard, 146 Idaho 37, 41, 190 P.3d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The
district comi did not abuse its discretion by denying Haggard's Rule 35 motion for correction of
an illegal sentence, as the sentence was not illegal."). But see contra State v. Clements, - Idaho
-, -

P.3d - , 2008 WL 2207576 (Ct. App. 2008) review granted (Sept. 23, 2008). In sum, it
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is self-evident that the jurisdiction of the court to decide a motion for correction of an illegal
sentence does not depend on whether the sentence is in fact illegal. (If that general proposition
were true, the court would not have jurisdiction to decide probation violation charges, for
example, unless there was an actual violation and the court would not have the jurisdiction to
conduct a preliminary hearing in a criminal case unless there was probable cause to charge the
defendant. These are obviously absurd results.)
B. The Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Plea Was Timely Because it Was Made Prior to
Resentencing.

The district court granted Mr. Peterson's Rule 35 motion on March 31, 2008. This order
vacated the sentence. Limited CR p. 44. On April 23, 2008, an Amended Motion to Withdraw
Plea was filed. Limited CR p. 52. As the sentencing was not until May 15, 2008, the motion
was timely under I.C.R. 33, which provides that "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be
made ... before sentence is imposed[.]" Here, as the court vacated the previous sentence, the
motion was made prior to sentencing.

State v. Janoski, 139 Idaho 352, 355, 79 P.3d 711, 714 (2003), is not apposite. In that
case the defendant was sentenced in 1994, but did not file his motion to withdraw his guilty plea
until 2003, which was five years after his appeal was final. Here, Mr. Peterson filed his
Amended Motion three weeks before he was to be resentenced. (The state cites to no authority
and makes no argument as to why a resentencing should not be treated the same as an original
sentencing for purposes of determining timeliness under Rule 33.)
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C. The Court Had Jurisdiction for Resentencing Proceedings and Thus Deprived Mr.
Peterson of the Assistance of Counsel When It Elicited a Pro Se "Motion" to Disqualify Judge
McDermott from Resentencing and Then Granted the Motion.

As argued above, the court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Once the court granted that motion, it follows perforce that it continued to have
jurisdiction over all matters related to the resentencing.
Next, the state's argument that Mr. Petersou did not have a constitutional right to an
attorney at the Rule 35 motion misses the mark. Even if it were true that a Rule 35 motion upon
which a hearing has been granted is not a critical stage for purposes of the Sixth Amendment,
Judge McDermott had already granted the Rule 35 motion and had moved to an issue related to
the resentencing, i.e., the question of who was going to preside over the resentencing. There can
be no doubt that there is a right to counsel at sentencing proceedings. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S.
128, 134 (1967) ("[A]ppointment of counsel for an indigent is required at every stage of a
criminal proceeding where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.") ( emphasis
added); Retamoza v. State, 125 Idaho 792, 796, 874 P.2d 603,607 (Ct. App. 1994). (Further,
State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 873 P.2d 167 (Ct.App. 1994), cited by the state for the proposition
that a Rule 35 motion is not a critical stage, is distinguishable because there was no hearing
granted in that case.)

D. The Court Had Jurisdiction to Consider the Motion to Disqualify Judge Harding
and the Motion to Reconsider.
As argued above, the court had jurisdiction to consider the motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Therefore, it had jurisdiction over the resentencing and the motion to disqualify Judge
Harding from presiding over the resentencing.
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E. The Court's Unjustified Increase of the Sentence Should be Vacated Because it is
Presumptively Vindictive and Violates Due Process.

Finally, the state argues that the increased sentence imposed by Judge Harding should not
be presumed to be vindictive nuder North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (I 969), rev 'din
part, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794 (1989). Rather, it contends that the sentence increase is
justified by Mr. Peterson's assertion of his right to remain silent during the second presentence
investigation report and the absence of a psychosexual evaluation. These facts, the argument
goes, make this case like State v. Clark, 136 Idaho 529, 37 P.3d 26 (Ct.App. 2001), where the
presumption of vindictiveness was overcome. That is not the case, however, because in Clark,
the district court remarked that the "regression in Clark's assumption of responsibility and his
generally disdainful attitude at the resentencing hearing indicate an even lesser likelihood of
rehabilitation and a greater risk to society ifhe were ever released-than was apparent at the
original sentencing hearing." 136 Idaho at 533, 37 P.3d at 30. Here, Mr. Peterson did not exhibit
a disdainful attitude at sentencing. Further Mr. Peterson did not regress in his acceptance of
responsibility, he merely asserted his right to remain silent at the presentence interview. PSI
(5/7/2008), p. 3. At the sentencing hearing, however, he fully admitted the offense conduct,
although he disagreed whether the conduct violated the law as written.
To accept responsibility, yes, I have been involved with this stuff over many,
many years. Unfortunately. And unfortunately, most of it has been socially
acceptable in a certain fringe, from Mainstream Magazines to some stuff on the
internet. That has certainly desensitized me. I am quite sure it has certainly
desensitized me towards other people. That, coupled with some ofmy
upbringing. There are various issues.
I don't seek to avoid responsibility at all. I am a grown man. I have had to come
to grips with that. I can't blame my parents. I can't blame my siblings. I can't
blame you. I can't blame anybody. I got myself into this situation. Now I have
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pied guilty because of how it was explained to me, the law. I disagree now on the
situation of the law. On the meaning of the law. I disagree that I violated the law
in a legal sense aud I will maintain that disagreement. However, at this point in
time, you have adjudicated that I don't have the opportunity to revisit that. So be
it.

However, back to the pornography issue. I caused these things to be in the
process ofdownloading onto my computer. I don't deny that. For my own
pleasure, as a matter of fact. I have to admit that as well. As I said, there are no
secrets anymore.
How do I feel about my crime? I think I have covered that. I feel very poorly abut
it. It tears me up. I have five children. I have four children that are pretty young.
I have a daughter who just turned 15. It would tear me up if she were involved
with that.

I feel sorry, extreme remorse, ifI have had any part ofhanning any children
indirectly. I have never hanned one directly. IfI have been a participant in their
harm indirectly, I am very, very remorseful for that. I beg the court to believe
that.
Tr. (May 15, 2008), p. 49, I. 5 -21; p. 50, I. 18- p. 51, I. 22
Thus, there was no material difference between this statement at resentencing and the
"Defendaut's Version" of events in the original PSI. PSI (11/26/2006), p. 3-4. Thus, the state's
argument that Mr. Peterson failed "to give details of his offenses or accept responsibility at the
time his presentence evaluation was prepared" is not gennane because Mr. Peterson did both at
sentencing.
Finally, the record shows that the absence of a psychosexual evaluation was not the cause
of the greater sentence. It does not appear that Judge Harding considered the absence of a report
in setting the sentence. See Tr. (May 15, 2008) p. 54-56. Instead, Judge Harding focused on
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what he saw as a lack ofremorse. Tr. (May 15, 2008), p. 56, l. 23-24. Thus, there is no evidence
that the lack of a presentence report made any difference in the sentence. Therefore, the Pearce
presumption of vindictiveness should still be applied.

III. CONCLUSION
Mr. Peterson asks that this Court reverse the district court's denial of his motion to
withdraw his guilty pleas and remand for a trial. Alternatively, the court should vacate the
sentences due to the errors regarding the disqualification of the judges and remand for further
proceedings. As a second alternative, this Court should reinstate Judge McDermott's original
sentences.
Respectfully submitted this

I;;;;,i~y of October, 2009.

~

LJ?M~~'-,___
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Robert Peterson
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this t!2ay of October, 2009, I caused two true and
correct copies of the foregoing to be mailed to: Nicole L. Schafer, Deputy Attorney General, P.O.
Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010.
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